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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 395 
Accident time: 14:30 Accident Date: 26/09/2002 
Where it occurred: Raab ett Talatine Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 21/10/2002 
ID original source: BoI: 010/2002: MJF Name of source: MACC SL 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: TM46 AT blast Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 27/02/2004 Date  last modified: 27/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 36 735070 
681838 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: 7351 Map north: 6818 
Map scale: UNIFIL Map series: TIBNIN 
Map edition: GENIMAP Map sheet: A 
Map name: 1:50:000  
 
Accident Notes 
dog missed mine (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
mechanical detonation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 




REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No010/2002 
MINE Accident that occurred in OES 3 on 26th September 2002.  
Map Reference: UNIFIL Genimap 1:50,000 Sheet A (Tibnin). 
 
Introduction 
1.  In accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC 
SL Operations Officer issued a verbal Convening Order Instruction on Thursday 26th 
September 2002, for an Accident Investigation.  
2.  This is a report by the MACC SL QA Officer into the Mine Accident that occurred on the 
26th September 2002. Based on the investigation, [Demining group]’s internal report (Annex 
A details), visits to the accident site and the photos from the accident site, this accident is 
considered preventable.
3.  The accident occurred at approximately 1430 hrs on 26th September 2002, in Minefield 
(M/F) No 299 at Raab ett Talatine, GR 36 735070 681838 (seat of detonation). Annex B 
details a map of the general area. 
 
Incident Details 
4.  On the 26th September 2002 at approximately 1430 hrs whilst [Name excised, the Victim], 
was ploughing a field in Raab ett Talatine, a detonation occurred under the left hand back 
wheel of his tractor. [The victim] managed to extract himself from the tractor and make his 
way to the side of the field whereupon he was assisted by the landowner, [name excised] and 
taken to Marjayoun Hospital. 
5.  The details of the accident were passed to [name excised] the Mukhtar (village head), of  
Raab ett Talatine who passed them directly to the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) Team 
Leader [name excised]. [The CLO] then passed all details to MACC SL Operations Officer 
who subsequently tasked MACC SL QA Officer to conduct a Mine Accident Investigation. 
 
BOI Mine Incident Actions 
6.  On arrival at the accident site the MACC SL QA Officer was met by [Demining group] 
Programme Manager [name excised], and [Demining group] Operations Manager [name 
excised]. After an initial appreciation of the incident site, it was decided that clearance would 
have to be conducted to the seat of detonation in order to carry out a full and detailed 
investigation. As there was much media interest at the incident site and basic safety 
instructions were not being adhered to by media personnel, it was decided that the clearance 
would be conducted at first light the following day (27th September 2002). [The village head 
man] was fully briefed on the situation prior to the BOI leaving the area. 
7.  On arrival of the BOI back at the MACC SL, the Operations Officer was briefed on the 
situation and the decision was made to include the MACC SL QA MDD Officer in the BOI as it 
was suspected that the area had been previously cleared  by [Demining group] MDD assets. 
8. At 0630 hrs on the 27th September 2002, [Demining group] EOD Team commenced 
clearance to the seat and around the seat of detonation and at 0745 hrs clearance was 
completed. Once the clearance had been completed, the BOI excavated the crater and 
primary fragment remnants of a TM-46 Anti Tank (AT) mine were recovered.  No actual 







PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING THE ACCIDENT AREA 
 
[Photograph showing the damage to the tractor wheel (the wheel hub was yellow).] 
 
 








9.  Following the initial BOI investigation, [Demining group] then started clearance around the 
tractor and through the area that had been initially cleared by MDD assets. Once the 
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immediate area had been cleared the BOI could then ascertain the actual location of the 
Turning Points (TPs) to verify if the accident had occurred inside a [Demining group] 
previously cleared area; the results indicated that the accident did actually occur inside a 
[Demining group] previously cleared area.  
10.  It was noted that an additional area to the North of the seat of detonation had also been 
cleared by [Demining group], but not actually recorded on the Completion Report. Within this 
additional area, an old AT mine crater, the skeletal remains of an animal and an old rusty 
piece of TM-46 AT mine primary fragmentation were located. Annex C details [Demining 
group] completion map with accident details annotated. 
 
Past History of the Area 
11.  IDF Northern Command reported the minefield details on the 29th May 2000, M/F 299 
details reported were: 
• Reference Point GR 36 735000 681919. 
• Mine type not known. 
• Date of mines laid not known. 
• No minefield map is available. 
12.  A statement from the MACC SL CMIO is shown at Annex D with the M/F report and the 
M/F spreadsheet shown as attachments to the Annex. {Annexes not made available.] 
13.  On the 12th July 2002 the MACC SL Planning Officer, [name excised], and [Demining 
group] Operations Manager [name excised] conducted a reconnaissance visit to M/F 299. 
Based on the information received by the witness, the high threat suspect area of concern 
was to the East of the accident site and the accident site was actually deemed as a low threat 
suspect area. Annex E details a witness statement from the MACC SL Planning Officer and 
M/F 299 Clearance Plan. 
14.  During the investigation the following information was obtained by the BOI whilst 
questioning [new unrecognised name excised] on the 27th September 2002, at the Accident 
Site: 
• The villagers from Raab ett Talatine left the area in 1977 following the arrival and 
subsequent problems associated with Palestinian refugees. 
• The last time the field was cultivated was in 1977 prior to the exodus of the population 
(25 years ago). 
• The villagers did not return to Raab ett Talatine until 5 years later in 1982, whereupon 
the following mine related accidents / incidents occurred: 
• There was a mine accident involving a cow in the same field. 
• There was a mine accident involving a local woman in the vicinity of the area 
(no other details were available). 
• A quantity of 6 x AT mines (type not known), were recovered from the same 
field of the accident by unknown personnel. 
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking  
15.  Task Dossier (TD) OES 3 #022 was issued to [Demining group] on the 03rd July 2002; 
the TD only contains details of M/F 299. Clearance operations commenced in M/F 299 on the 
15th July 2002 and operations ceased on the 02nd August 2002. [Demining group] Manual 
(Team No3) and MDD assets were used to clear a total area size of 19,600 m2; no items of 
ordnance were located during the clearance operation. The task was accepted by the MACC 
SL on the 29th August 2002, Annex F details the Completion Report. 
 
Details of the Ordnance Involved 
16. The TM-46 Anti Tank (AT), mine is a large metal cased AT blast mine of Soviet origin 
containing 5.7kgs of TNT. The cylindrical body has a stepped pressure plate with a central 
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threaded fuze well. On the side of the mine a steel carrying handle and a filler plug are 
located, on the base of the mine there are 5 x stamped reinforcing ribs. 
17.  In addition to the standard pressure fuzes (MV-5 and MVM), the mine can also accept a 
tilt-rod fuze (MVSh-46), that gives it a full width attack capability against vehicles. 
 




18.  [The victim] was evacuated to Marjayoun Government Hospital by car, whereupon he 
was admitted to the casualty department for stabilisation and treatment. [The victim] suffered 
multiple fractures of his left foot, secondary fragmentation injuries to his left leg and a fracture 
to his left hand second finger. Annex G details the hospital report from Marjayoun Hospital. 
 
Conclusions 
19. Based on the Accident Investigation the following is concluded:   
a. There was a sub-surface detonation of a TM-46 (fuzed MV-5), AT mine.  
b. The crater measured 48cm deep and 70cm wide, with large quantities of TM-46 
primary fragmentation lining the sides and bottom the crater. 50% of the crater 
showed signs of a bulbous effect (heavy soil area), no bulbous effects was shown 
in the other 50% of the crater due to rocky ground. 
c. Based on the above conclusion, it is estimated that the TM-46 AT mine detonated 
at a depth of 300mm / 350 mm below the surface. 
d. The TM-46 AT mine may have been originally laid by Palestinian forces and not 
Israeli forces. 
e. The detonation occurred when the tractor driven by [the victim]. Drove over the 
location of the said TM-46 AT mine, with the detonation occurring directly under 
the tractor’s back left hand wheel. 
f. The injuries sustained to [the victim] were relatively light considering the nature of 
the incident. It was fortunate that a fatality did not occur. 
g. The tractor was lifted and moved approximately 2m to the North East following 
the uncontrolled detonation. 
h. The Mine Accident AT crater was located inside a previously cleared [Demining 
group] MDD area that had been physically marked and included in the 
Completion Report. 
i. The additional AT mine crater was formed when a cow inadvertently initiated a 
TM-46 AT mine in 1982, on the return of Raab ett Talatine population after their 5 
x year exodus. This crater was located inside a previously cleared [Demining 
group] MDD area that had not been physically marked on the ground and was not 
included in the Completion Report. 
j. The Completion Report submitted was not an accurate reflection of the clearance 
activities that were conducted and should have not have been accepted by [name 
excised]. 
k. The old AT mine crater located by the BOI should have been identified by the 
clearance team. This information if it was made available at that time would have 
changed the threat assessment and the clearance plan and the clearance 
methodology. 
5 
l. The information received by the MACC SL Planning Officer during the initial site 
reconnaissance from local sources, was erroneous information. Unfortunately the 
clearance plan was then based on this erroneous information and [Demining 
group] executed the clearance of the area according to this plan. 
m. Additional information could have been gained by the CLOs during regular visits 
to the site whilst clearance was being conducted. As previously mentioned if the 
additional information had been made available then [Demining group]’s threat 
assessment of that particular area would have changed.  
n. [Demining group]’s IMSMA Accident Report along with the Programmes Manager 
statement (Annex A), is accepted by the BOI. 
o. The Handover and Formal Declaration Certificate for M/F 299 was processed and 
accepted on the 24th September 2002. Annex H details the Handover and 
Formal Declaration Certificate. 
 
Recommendations 
20. Based on the Accident Investigation, the following is recommended:   
a. The area that was cleared by MDD assets in M/F 299 be re-cleared using Manual 
assets and the completion report amended accordingly. 
b. Completion Report information must be a true and accurate reflection of the 
clearance activities that have been conducted. All cleared areas must be marked, 
mapped and recorded accurately both physically on the ground and annotated in 
Completion Reports. 
c. [Demining group] made aware of the vital importance of looking at the ground and 
terrain prior to clearance operations commencing, during clearance operations 
and following clearance operations. 
d. CLOs be made aware of the importance of obtaining all relevant information on 
mined areas, in a timely manner (ideally prior to the commencement of clearance 
operations).  
e. A CLO “Questions to Ask” proforma is drafted for NDO approval; the performa is 
to include all the relevant questions that should be asked when questioning the 
local populous regarding possible contaminated areas. It is also suggested that 
the performa is used a minimum of three times, each with a different member of 
the community for each contaminated area. 
 
Specialist Report 
21. As the Mine Accident involved an area previously cleared by MDD, a report by the MACC 
SL QA MDD Officer is detailed at Annex I, this report also contains MDD specific conclusions 
and recommendations. [Report not made available.] 
 
Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon 
 
Annexes: [some not made available.] 
A. [Demining group] Internal Report. 
B. Map of the General Area. 
C. Diagram of the Accident Scene ([Demining group] Completion Map with Accident Details 
annotated). 
D. M/F Information report by CMIO. 
E. Witness Statement from MACC SL Planning Officer and M/F 299 Clearance Plan. 
F. [Demining group] M/F299 Completion Report. 
G. Marjayoun Hospital Report. 
H. M/F 299 Handover and Formal Declaration Certificate. 




MACC SL Operations Department. 
NDO. 
[Uninvolved demining group]. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 510 Name: Name removed 
Age: 38 Gender: Male 
Status: civilian  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 






See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief medical report from Marjayoun hospital is reproduced below. 
Name: [excised] Age: 38 Sex: Male 
After treating [name excised], who was injured by a landmine explosion this resulted in 
breaking his left foot and left hand second finger. Metal fragments were located in his lower 
left leg and left thigh which resulted in emergency surgery. The broken bones were fixed, 
wounds cleaned and he was admitted in the hospital for observation. 
27/09/02 Dr [name excised]. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the demining 
group “reduced” the area without revising their assessment of the area to take account of 
known detonations/accidents in the area. This may have been done because their training 
was inadequate. Similarly, the ineffective use of the dogs to check the area may have been 
ineffective due to inadequate training. Whatever the cause, the dogs were not used 
effectively, which is a management responsibility, so the secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management/control inadequacy”. 
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